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1How but in custom and in ceremony
Are innocence and beauty born?
— W.B. Yeats, A Prayer for My Daughter, 26 February 1919
So you see, despite my strong sense of freedom, I have 
not been able to avoid my native upbringing which keeps 
young girls strictly apart from male strangers. If you are 
constantly told that it is unseemly to allow yourself as a 
young girl to be revealed to the gaze of strange men, and if 
you must stay out of the presence of men then eventually 
it must make you nervous to meet such creatures. This 
must not continue, that prejudice must be removed.
— Kartini, Letters to Stella Zeehandelaar, 17 May 1902
William Butler Yeats wrote A Prayer for My Daughter a few months after he had completed The Second Coming, his bleak reflection on the transformation of the modern 
world into one in which violence and anarchy promised to dominate 
human affairs. In that poem, he had lamented the falling apart 
of the established order: ‘the blood-dimmed tide is loosed’ and 
‘everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned.’ Anne Butler 
Yeats was born on 26 February 1919, in the month after the Irish 
Republic’s declaration of independence and at a time when the 
country was turning to war. In the poem for his daughter, written 
in the midst of bloody violence, Yeats expresses the wish that Anne 
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might come to find a life free of hatred, especially intellectual 
hatred; that she might make a life marked not by thoughts and 
opinions but by the stability of the gentle and unassuming ways of 
a home; that she might be brought to a house by a bridegroom who 
would enable her to flourish under the quiet shade of custom. 
Yeats’s hopes for his daughter stand in striking contrast to the 
thoughts expressed by Kartini, the young Javanese noblewoman 
whose writings inspired Indonesia’s nationalists at about the same 
time that the Irish poet was watching his own country descend 
into war. Kartini’s writings were dominated by a longing for 
liberation from the tyranny of custom that required her to spend 
her adolescent years enclosed in the grounds of the family home, 
anticipating an arranged marriage to a man who would take her as 
one of his many wives. She associated ceremony not with innocence 
or beauty but with tedium and oppression. Her ardent wish was 
for the Dutch to leave the colonies, but not before breathing into 
the Indonesian archipelago the spirit of freedom she thought was to 
be found at that time only in Europe. Indeed, she longed to leave 
Java for Holland, to study and to live as an independent woman, 
rather than stay to become a wife and mistress of a household.*
It should come as no surprise that a European should think that 
the advent of modernity promised disruption and destruction, or 
that he should long for a return to traditional ways. The history of 
European thought is full of such sentiments. Nor should it astonish 
anyone that an Asian writer should be so critical of tradition, since 
the importance of modernisation has been a persistent theme in 
the works of non-Western intellectuals and activists from Russia 
and Turkey to China, India and Malaya. Yet the contrast between 
Yeats and Kartini bears closer analysis because it suggests that the 
*   I have considered Kartini’s life and thought at greater length in my 
‘The Dilemma of a Dutiful Daughter: Love and Freedom in the Thought of 
Kartini,’ in Debra Satz and Rob Reich (eds.), Towards a Humanist Justice: 
The Political Philosophy of Susan Okin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 181–201. 
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tension between modernity and tradition has many dimensions and 
cannot be accounted for by seeking out and identifying clear fault 
lines dividing one kind of thinking from another. Who is for 
tradition and who for modernity? To pose the question in this 
way is already go down the wrong track.
How, then, should the question be posed? Indeed why should 
it be posed at all? Or to put it differently, what exactly is the 
question? Perhaps we might begin to work this out by reflecting 
on what it is that Yeats and Kartini, in their different ways, were 
concerned about. The first thing to notice, of course, is that these 
writers struggled to maintain a consistent attitude to the issues 
they confronted as they tried to deal with changing circumstances. 
The Yeats who was disdainful of politics and disapproving of the 
use of violence in the pursuit of Irish independence, nonetheless 
wrote Easter, 1916, in which the poet’s reservations about the Easter 
Rising, which saw Irish republican leaders executed for treason, 
are transmuted into a work that eulogised the revolutionary members 
of the uprising in spite of Yeats’s deep disagreements with them. 
The man who wrote critically of the revolutionaries’ hardening 
of the heart—‘enchanted to a stone’—turned into a Senator who 
was willing to capitalise on his fame as a Nobel laureate to become 
a forceful and uncompromising critic of the government and the 
Roman Catholic Church. The man who defended in his early poetry 
the life of contemplation over the life of action, as a politician 
spoke out passionately against the laws forbidding divorce and 
warned of the danger of establishing an Irish theocracy, which he 
was certain would end the possibility of a united Ireland. He wanted 
to promote the Irish language, but argued against erecting Irish 
signs; he wanted democratic government, but by his own admission 
retained some Tory sensibilities and remained suspicious of the 
masses. He wanted things to stay the same, yet saw that change 
not only was coming but had to be ushered in, perhaps even by his 
own efforts.
He, too, has been changed in his turn,
Transformed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
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The dilemmas Kartini faced were different, for she had no 
opportunity to see a life of action and lived almost entirely in her 
thoughts and correspondence. As a young Javanese girl, she came to 
be known outside the compound of her family home only because 
she was taught to read and write. Kartini wrote extensively to literary 
women in Holland expressing her longing for freedom, for release 
from under the crushing weight of adat or custom. In some respects, 
she was brought up by her father in the way Yeats wanted to bring 
up his own daughter: to live a life devoted to a family and home, 
and to the nurturing of others. Though her father indulged her 
interests in reading, and even tolerated her expressions of longing 
to study in Europe, she was brought up to believe that her most 
important duty was to the family. Her plans to open a school for 
girls in Batavia brought her notoriety but no respect from the local 
community. Nonetheless, her Dutch friends managed to obtain 
a scholarship for her to study in Holland. All she had to do was 
to persuade her father to allow her to go. Her plan was to reform 
herself through study abroad, and then to return to Java to reform her 
society and her countrymen. 
I want to breathe in the European air to rid myself 
completely of the residue of prejudice which still clings 
to me—there is not much that still holds me back. 
Holland must and shall make me in reality a free woman. 
Your air, your cold, must dislodge all the prejudices  
which still cling to me. Only then shall I be free!
Remarkably, she succeeded in persuading her father to grant her 
permission to go. At the last minute, however, she had a change of 
heart, declined the scholarship, and agreed to an arranged marriage 
to become the principal wife of the Regent of Rembang.
For all her railing against the tyranny of custom and her plans to 
reform Javanese society to bring it into the modern world, Kartini 
found herself unable to go against what she saw as her duty to her 
parents and community. Though she associated her traditions with 
prejudice and ignorance, she found she could not forsake them 
because to do so would be not simply to abandon a few rules or 
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abstractions but to transform her relations with the people who 
mattered to her, and to whom she mattered also. Her feelings were 
perhaps not so different from those Yeats discovered when composing 
Easter, 1916, as he found himself writing not only about political 
events and abstract ideals but also about men he had known, with 
whom he had exchanged ‘polite meaningless words’ in spite of 
deep differences of opinion. The words Kartini wrote to her Dutch 
feminist friends expressed her strongest convictions about what it 
was to be free and about the importance of struggling to overcome 
both the injustice of colonial rule and the tyranny of custom. Yet, 
in the end, these convictions counted for less than the thought that 
to go against the wishes of those with whom she exchanged only 
meaningless words was somehow impossible.
Less than a year after marriage, Kartini died in childbirth. Stella 
Zeehandelaar, the Dutch feminist with whom she had corresponded 
but never met, was both shocked and outraged at this turn of 
events. Kartini’s letters had been full of criticisms of, and expressions 
of loathing for, the idea of arranged marriage—and even more 
ferocious objections to polygamy. She had herself been torn 
between loyalty to her natural mother and her duty to honour her 
father’s principal wife, and her antipathy towards this tradition 
was born of long and unhappy experience. For Zeehandelaar, 
it was inconceivable that Kartini would go willingly into an 
arranged marriage to a polygamist. She was convinced that only a 
conspiracy among the family could explain Kartini’s decision to 
cleave to her traditions.
Liberals have often struggled to come to terms with people’s 
attachments to their traditions—to custom, religion and local 
connections. Liberalism’s most famous advocate, John Stuart Mill, 
devoted his essay On Liberty as much to the excoriation of custom 
as to the defence of individual freedom. Many modern liberals have 
been eager to tout the virtues of diversity, but many have equally 
found it difficult to tolerate customs or traditions that do not conform 
to liberalism’s deepest commitments to equality and individual 
liberty. They wish to respect people’s freedom to be different; but 
cannot remain indifferent to their attachment to traditions that 
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place other values—piety, quietism or simply family—above 
individuality, equality or freedom. The dilemma for these liberals is 
what to say—and do—about people who exercise their freedom by 
giving it away, or by refusing to nourish or promote it.
One common response has been to say that, one way or another, 
people have to be brought into the modern world, weaned off at 
least some of their traditions so they can find some place in the new 
society. Some think we should do it for the common good, others for 
the sake those traditional societies (to raise their living standards), 
and yet others that we should do it for the children. Another 
response is to say that people already are in the modern world, for 
the world is flat and not nearly as differentiated as we imagine. 
Under every traditional robe is a pocket for a cell-phone. The thought 
is that modernity has, or must eventually, eclipse tradition; the issue 
is how to manage the transformation, or to break the news to those 
who haven’t quite cottoned on to the fact that they are moderns, 
living in or moving into a modern world. Another common way of 
putting it is to say that the problem for liberals is how to liberalise 
a world of people who are resistant to liberalism; and this means 
modernising people who are wedded to pre-modern traditions.
Yet could this way of viewing the issue be mistaken? What, 
in the end, is the difference between traditional and modern? 
Let me suggest that this distinction is not a very useful one 
for understanding the problems confronting liberal society, or 
for working out how to address them. The trouble is not that 
these terms have no meaning, or that the contrast between 
traditional and modern makes no sense; it’s rather that the contrast 
does not pick out a tension or conflict or source of difference 
about which we can usefully generalise.
If we look across society, say within a nation state, it is difficult 
to divide people into traditional and modern by using any standard 
markers. We cannot, for example, say that cities are modern and 
rural areas are traditional. After all, we have old cities as well as young 
towns. Are newly growing cities made up of retirees traditional or 
modern? Nor would it do simply to associate the old with the 
traditional and the young with the modern, as if old liberals 
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must be traditional and young conservatives modern. We could 
try distinguishing cultures into traditional and modern, but that 
does not look promising since cultures themselves are difficult to 
define or isolate, and typically comprise what could be described 
as traditional and modern elements. One could be a modern 
Aboriginal or Maori, just as one could be a traditional Englishman 
(whatever that might mean). Technological sophistication does not 
make much difference either, since one can use modern technologies 
to preserve or access traditional practices—an iPod can store an 
ancient text (like the Quran) as easily as it can a contemporary 
pop song.
There is no tension in liberal society between the traditional 
and the modern, and there is nothing to reconcile except to the 
extent that in any society, there is a problem of how to face the fact of 
change and social transformation. To the extent that this is an issue, 
it is difficult to see which part of society is the traditional and which 
part is the modern. For example, if Australia moved from a 
predominantly English society to a multicultural society by admitting 
people from older cultural traditions, should this be seen as Australia 
modernising from its British traditions or becoming less modern? 
Multiculturalism could be seen as a modern idea; but equally it 
could be viewed as an anti-modern one if it means tolerating cultural 
diversity rather than insisting on the predominance of values some 
would consider modern.
Yet maybe this is all missing the point. After all, Yeats was 
worried about something when we wrote of the attractions of 
a return to a life away from the madding crowd, and Kartini was 
not deluded when she felt the weight of Javanese custom bearing 
down upon her. Surely there is some tension at work in a society 
in which such writers can express an anxiety about the way the world 
is moving—or failing to move—and in which the forces of change 
provoke hope in some and despair in others. It seems a bit much 
simply to say at this point: move along, nothing to see here!
I think there is a tension at work in liberal as well as other 
societies, but the relevant contrast is not between the traditional 
and the modern. The tension is between two tendencies or attitudes: 
8Reconciling Modernity and Tradition in a Liberal Society
the communitarian and the cosmopolitan. When Yeats reflected 
on what we wanted for his daughter, his mind turned to hearth 
and home and to the particular attachments he thought gave life 
meaning, or gave days their worth. There she might be free from 
the hatreds that marked the wider world, where ideas clashed and 
conflict found no resolution. Home was where she might find shelter 
under the ‘spreading laurel tree’ of custom. In reality, however, Yeats 
found that it was not so easy to retreat from the wider world, for 
people within one’s own community might be caught up in it, and 
if one wants to share even a few polite, meaningless words with 
them, then one will be drawn little by little into the vortex and find 
oneself involved in the world of affairs. It is hard to be merely a 
communitarian, for every community is to some degree a part of 
the world and retreat is rarely entirely possible.
From the perspective of Kartini, on the other hand, the same 
problem arises from the opposite direction. She wished not to 
retreat from the wider world but to escape into it, to find her way as 
an independent spirit—an unencumbered self, to use a well-known 
communitarian phrase—free of the demands of those to whom 
she was bound by ties of kinship and loyalty. But as Yeats found it 
hard to retreat, Kartini found it hard to escape, for the strings of 
attachment were hard to break. Though it is tempting to think 
Kartini was somehow forced to make the decision she did, or that 
she was the victim of some cruel conspiracy as Stella Zeehandelaar 
suspected, the reality was that she found herself caught between 
two worlds: the world of the wider society and the world of the 
local community. 
In The Fatal Conceit, F.A. Hayek suggested that this is the great 
dilemma modern human beings face. They have built through 
spontaneous evolution an extended order of cooperation that 
transcends the face-to-face society, and this requires a kind of morality 
of abstract rules that makes that cooperation possible. Yet all their 
instincts pull them back towards the morality of the tribe, for their 
inclinations are to put particular loyalties above abstract concerns. 
In Hayek’s analysis, this tension is not resolvable in any definitive 
way: humans simply have to live in two worlds at once. The extent 
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to which they will be able to do so will vary; yet there will always 
be those who find themselves torn as they are pulled in different 
directions by powerful and uncontrollable forces.
There is, however, another dimension to this matter. Some 
political thinkers—and activists—consider that the resolution to 
this problem lies in making the wider society, perhaps in the form 
of the state, into something much more like a moral community. 
Perhaps the values of the local community can be writ large, to build 
a state that has a substantial ethic that will give people a home in 
the world. Then they will not find themselves alienated, either 
from their local attachments or from the greater society of which 
they are a part. The alternative that stands in direct contrast to this 
view is a cosmopolitan view, which is sceptical of the claims of local 
communities and prefers to be guided by universal values. Both 
these views, in different ways, seek to find a political resolution of 
the tension between local attachment and the demands of the wider 
world, but both should be resisted. The communitarian should 
be resisted because the world beyond the local cannot be made to 
conform to a common substantive ethic when values are plural 
and diverse. The cosmopolitan should be resisted because there are 
no universal values we can safely say are universal and not in fact 
particular norms masquerading as universal.
Where then do we go from here? One answer, it is tempting to 
offer, is to say that we appeal to liberalism as the solution to the 
problem. The trouble is, the solutions I have already alluded to 
are also liberal solutions of a sort. There are liberals who propose 
a liberalism that involves the creation or sustaining of a kind of 
national community—a land that is one nation, to coin a phrase—in 
which certain values held to be consistent with national traditions 
trump all others. This communitarian liberalism does not look 
plausible in a society in which diversity and ethical differences 
prevail. On the other hand, there are liberals who propose that we 
should be guided by universal values and claim that liberalism is 
a kind of universal ethic that reason can bring all to embrace. But this 
also looks improbable simply because there are many people who are 
unwilling to accept liberalism as a substantive ethical doctrine that 
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can guide ethical reflection and trump particular moral convictions 
born of local forms of association.
So I suggest instead that the most we can hope to do is to live 
with the tension. For the tension in question is not one that is 
capable of resolution. The best we can do is stumble along making 
a succession of accommodations as the world changes around us. 
This is, of course, also a kind of liberalism. It’s not the traditional 
view of liberalism according to modern liberals. But in my view, 
it is closer to the philosophical core of the liberal aspiration not to 
resolve differences and build a unified social order but to find ways 
to live with competition, conflict and division.





